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Abstract
Reducing the peak energy consumption of households is es-
sential for the effective use of renewable energy sources, in
order to ensure that as much household demand as possi-
ble can be met by renewable sources. This entails spreading
out the use of high-powered appliances such as dishwashers
and washing machines throughout the day. Traditional ap-
proaches to this problem have relied on differential pricing
set by a centralised utility company. But this mechanism has
not been effective in promoting widespread shifting of ap-
pliance usage. Here we consider an alternative decentralised
mechanism, where agents receive an initial allocation of time-
slots to use their appliances and can then exchange these with
other agents. If agents are willing to be more flexible in the
exchanges they accept, then overall satisfaction, in terms of
the percentage of agents time-slot preferences that are satis-
fied, will increase. This requires a mechanism that can in-
centivise agents to be more flexible. Building on previous
work, we show that a mechanism incorporating social capital
- the tracking of favours given and received - can incentivise
agents to act flexibly and give favours by accepting exchanges
that do not immediately benefit them. We demonstrate that
a mechanism that tracks favours increases the overall satis-
faction of agents, and crucially allows social agents that give
favours to outcompete selfish agents that do not under payoff-
biased social learning. Thus, even completely self-interested
agents are expected to learn to produce socially beneficial
outcomes.
Introduction
The UK government has committed to a legally binding tar-
get to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050.
This requires a shift to renewable energy sources, such as
solar panels and wind turbines. However, integrating renew-
able energy sources into a centralised and monolithic ‘na-
tional grid’ is difficult because their output inherently de-
pends on weather conditions. As such, they cannot simply
be ‘switched on and off’ to meet demand in the way that
coal, gas, and nuclear power stations can be to match sup-
ply and demand. Governments and energy providers have
recognised that this problem of load balancing – matching
supply and demand – is easier to solve on a local scale. Con-
sequently, they are supporting the development of ‘commu-
nity energy systems’, where a community (e.g. a town or a
small island) owns and manages its own renewable energy
sources (Walker and Devine-Wright, 2008).
The shift towards community energy systems means that
communities now become involved in some of the tasks that
were previously handled by a centralised national grid. In
particular, they now become involved in the balancing of
supply and demand. A key problem here is how to re-
duce peak demand, i.e. the maximal amount of electricity
that is demanded at any one moment in time. If a commu-
nity’s peak demand is too high, then it is unlikely that it
will be able to be met by the community’s renewable energy
sources, and so the community is likely to have to resort to
buying in electricity from non-renewable sources.
The traditional approach to reducing peak demand is dif-
ferential pricing set by a central utility company. Simply
put, households are incentivised to run their appliances at
times of low demand through lower pricing at these times
(Stern et al., 1986; Dutta and Mitra, 2017). Traditionally,
this has involved utility companies offering cheaper elec-
tricity overnight. Could a community energy system use the
same mechanism? Potentially, however, variable pricing in-
herently discriminates against more vulnerable households
on lower incomes (Simmons and Rowlands, 2007). Then
there is the question of how prices should be set and who
should set them? People are unlikely to take part in such
a scheme unless they perceive that they are being treated
fairly.
To address these issues, we consider an alternative mech-
anism for load balancing in a community energy system,
which is not based on pricing set by some centralised au-
thority. We assume that each household will have preferred
time-slots for when they would like to run high-powered ap-
pliances such as washing machines, dishwashers and electric
heating. The aim is then to allocate actual time-slots to each
household for when they run their appliances. On the one
hand, this is a classic multi-objective optimisation problem
of reducing peak consumption (the maximum amount of en-
ergy demanded in a time-slot) while satisfying each house-
holds’ preferences as far as possible. On the other hand,
issues of fairness are central. If households are to be moti-
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vated to use the mechanism then they will need to perceive
the resulting allocation of time-slots to households as be-
ing fair (distributive justice, Rescher 1966). Furthermore,
households will need to be able to understand why some of
their time-slot preferences have not been met, and why the
preferences of some other households may have been met
instead. In other words, they need to perceive the allocation
procedure as treating them fairly (procedural justice, Hol-
landerBlumoff and Tyler 2008).
Petruzzi et al. (2013) propose a mechanism inspired by
the building of social capital between agents (households,
or software agents representing them). In their mecha-
nism, agents are initially allocated time-slots at random, but
can then propose exchanges of time-slots with other agents.
Agents have two possible strategies. Selfish agents only
accept exchanges that provide them with one of their pre-
ferred time-slots. Social agents, on the other hand, accept
not only these beneficial exchanges but also accept an ex-
change request if they owe a favour to another agent (pro-
vided the exchange will not cause them to lose one of their
preferred time-slots).. An agent owes a favour to another
if the other agent has previously accepted an exchange re-
quest from them. Petruzzi et al. (2013) showed that under
this mechanism, a group where every agent was social had
on average more of their time-slot preferences satisfied than
a group where every agent was selfish. They construed the
recording of favours given and received, and the acting upon
this by social agents, as the accumulation of a form of elec-
tronic social capital (Putnam, 1994; Petruzzi et al., 2014).
Presumably, this would be intuitive for households to under-
stand.
However, two important questions arise from this work.
First, to what extent is social capital a necessary part of
the mechanism? Would social agents that always accept ex-
changes that do not cause them to lose a preferred time-slot
also reach outcomes with high average satisfaction, with-
out the need to track favours given and received? Second,
should we expect self-interested agents to adopt the self-
ish or the social strategy? We address both of these ques-
tions in this paper. To address the first, we re-examine the
Petruzzi et al. (2013) model by allowing social capital to be
turned off. To address the second, we consider mixed popu-
lations of selfish and social agents that change their strategy
according to payoff-biased social learning (Boyd and Rich-
erson, 1985). We find that while a mechanism without social
capital allows a pure population of social agents to perform
better than a pure population of selfish agents, when agents
can change their strategy through social learning then social
capital is necessary for social agents to outcompete selfish
agents. Our results demonstrate that a time-slot allocation
mechanism based on social capital can reduce peak electric-
ity consumption, promote social behaviour, and lead to out-
comes where the average satisfaction of households is high,
even when agents are entirely self-interested.
The Energy Exchange Simulation
The Petruzzi et al. (2013) model was built to represent a
smart energy network consisting of 96 individual agents.
Each day agents request four hour-long time-slots in which
they require electricity. All requests are for 1KWh of en-
ergy, and there can never be more than 16 agents using the
same time-slot, as this is considered the peak capacity of the
system. Time-slots are initially allocated at random at the
start of the day, so few agents are likely to have their allo-
cation match all of their requested time-slots. Because of
this, after the initial allocation agents can partake in pair-
wise exchanges where one agent requests to swap one of its
time-slots with a second agent, and the second agent decides
whether or not to fulfil the request. We define an agent’s sat-
isfaction as the proportion of its time-slot preferences that
have been satisfied, and track the mean value of this as a
measure of how well the mechanism is satisfying the agents’
preferences.
Agents can follow either social or selfish strategies, which
impacts how they react to incoming requests for exchanges.
Selfish agents will only accept exchanges that are in their
immediate interest. This means that selfish agents need to
be offered a time-slot that they have initially requested and
do not already have in order for them to agree to the ex-
change. Social agents also agree to these mutually benefi-
cial exchanges. However, they also make decisions based
on social capital, in the form of repaying previous favours
given to them by other agents. Specifically, when a social
agent’s request is accepted, they record it as a favour given to
them. When a social agent receives a request from another
agent who previously gave them a favour, they will accept
the request if it is not detrimental to their own satisfaction
and record that the favour has been repaid. This improves
the satisfaction of the other agent while earning themselves
more social capital. This leads to a system of social agents
earning and repaying favours among one another, increasing
the number of accepted exchange requests.
Exchanges begin on a day once each agent has received
their initial allocation and decided which of these time-slots
they wish to keep. They then anonymously advertise slots
that they have been allocated but do not want to an ‘ad-
vertising board’. Several exchange rounds then take place
during the day, where the number of rounds is a parameter
of the model that sets the maximum number of exchanges
an agent can engage in per day. In each exchange round,
agents can request a time-slot from the board, so long as
they have not already received a request from another agent
during that round. Agents accept or refuse requests based
on their strategy as described above. Only social capital, i.e.
social agents’ memory of favours, remains between days.
We expand on the original Petruzzi et al. (2013) model
by introducing social learning, allowing agents to change
from selfish to social or vice versa (note that both social
and selfish agents undergo ‘social’ learning, which we re-
fer to simply as ‘learning’ from now on to avoid confusion).
This works as follows. At the end of each day, a percent-
age of the agents are randomly selected to undergo learn-
ing. Each agent performing learning observes a randomly
selected second agent. If the observed agent has a higher sat-
isfaction than the agent in question, then the first agent will
copy the strategy of the observed agent with a probability
proportionate to the difference between the two agents’ sat-
isfactions. Learning is thus payoff-biased (Boyd and Rich-
erson, 1985), with strategies giving higher individual satis-
faction more likely to spread in the population. Agents that
move from a social strategy to the selfish strategy retain their
accumulated social capital. Pseudocode for the simulation
procedure is given in Algorithm 11.
We also consider, as a counterpoint to social capital, sim-
ulations where social capital is not recorded by agents, re-
sulting in social agents accepting any non-detrimental ex-
change. We refer to the social agents under this mechanism
as social without social capital. All simulation results are
averaged over 50 runs for each variation of the simulation
parameters. The parameters that we vary are the number of
exchange rounds per day, and the number of agents undergo-
ing social learning at the end of each day (the learning rate).
We hold the other parameters constant across simulations
with the values given in Table 1.
Parameter Value
Population size 96
Number of days 500
Time-slots per day 24
Slots selected by each agent 4
Maximum agents per time-slot 16
Simulation runs 50
Table 1: Constant parameter values.
Results from an illustrative run of the Energy Exchange
Simulation can be seen in Figure 1, showing how agent sat-
isfaction changes over time.
Results and Analysis
To answer the research questions raised in the introduction,
our analysis of the simulation proceeds as follows. We first
consider populations where every agent uses the same strat-
egy, and there is no learning. This allows us to determine
whether a pure population of social agents using the mech-
anism without social capital can do as well as a pure popu-
lation of agents that do track social capital. We then go on
to consider mixed populations where both selfish and social
agents are present and can switch their strategies through
learning. This allows us to determine the conditions under
which social agents can outcompete selfish agents, and the
1Source code is available at https://github.com/
NathanABrooks/ResourceExchangeArena
Algorithm 1 The Energy Exchange Simulation.
1: d← current day
2: e← current exchange round
3: A← set of a agents
4: L← number of agents a undergoing learning
5: for d = 1 to MAX DAYS do
6: for each a ∈ A do
7: a.receive random allocation()
8: end for
9: for e = 1 to MAX EXCHANGES do
10: V ← set of v adverts
11: for each a ∈ A do
12: v ← a.determine unwanted time slots()
13: V .list advert(v)
14: end for
15: for each a ∈ A do
16: if a.received request() == true then
17: go to next agent
18: end if
19: if a.satisfaction() == 1 then
20: go to next agent
21: else
22: r ← a.identify beneficial exchange(V )
23: a.request exchange(r)
24: end if
25: end for
26: for each a ∈ A do
27: if a.received request() == true then
28: a.accept exchange if approved()
29: end if
30: end for
31: for each a ∈ A do
32: if a.made exchange() and a.agent type == So-
cial then
33: a.update social capital()
34: end if
35: end for
36: end for
37: dl ← 0
38: while dl < L do
39: a1 ← random agent that hasn’t considered chang-
ing strategy today
40: a2 ← random agent to observe
41: if a1.satisfaction() < a2.satisfaction() then
42: x← random value between 0 and 1
43: if (a2.satisfaction() - a1.satisfaction()) > x then
44: a1.copy strategy(a2)
45: end if
46: end if
47: dl ← dl + 1
48: end while
49: end for
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Figure 1: Average satisfaction per day for a typical run of
the simulation. The run shown here includes social capi-
tal, uses a learning rate of 50%, and 100 exchange rounds
per day. The optimum result is calculated as the proportion
of requested time-slots that exist within the simulation and
could therefore be allocated to an agent who requested them.
extent to which this is affected by whether social capital is
tracked.
Single Strategy Populations
To establish a baseline for the performance of each of the
available strategies explored here (selfish, and social with
and without social capital), each is first run in isolation of
the others, i.e. as a pure population of the strategy. Average
(mean) satisfaction heatmaps for these simulations, across
all parameters, can be seen in Figure 2. Optimal perfor-
mance in these simulations would result in an average sat-
isfaction of approximately 0.91 (as seen in Figure 1). From
Figure 2 we can see that social populations with social cap-
ital achieve this optimal performance over the vast major-
ity of parameters settings. Selfish populations, on the other
hand, consistently fall short of optimal satisfaction, but do
show improvement as the number of rounds of exchanges
on a day increases. No improvement is seen as the number
of days the simulation is run for is increased, which follows
from the fact that the only state carried over between days
is social capital, with selfish agents do not use. Social pop-
ulations without the social capital mechanism similarly ex-
hibit no improvement as the number of days increases for the
same reason. But crucially, they reach optimal performance
on the first day, if afforded enough exchanges. The inclu-
sion of social capital means that agents require more days
to reach (near) optimal performance, with this only being
achieved after 100 days of social capital accumulation.
Overall, it is clear from Figure 2 that satisfaction is de-
pendent on the number of exchanges available to agents,
and that social agents are able to break of out sub-optimal
states more easily than selfish agents. This is through social
agents accepting exchanges that are neutral to their satisfac-
tion but that increase the satisfaction of another agent. How-
ever, the tracking and consideration of social capital slows
this process down compared to the mechanism without so-
cial capital. This is because with tracking of social capital,
social agents will only accept neutral exchanges if they owe
a favour to the other agent, and so they behave like selfish
agents until they begin to owe favours from previous days.
Mixed Populations without Social Capital
Results for populations which combine selfish and social
agents, but without access to social capital (resulting in
social agents always accepting non-detrimental exchanges)
can be seen in Figure 3. In these simulations, populations
start with an equal number of social and selfish agents, with
learning taking place at the end of each day, affecting the
overall ratio of social to selfish agents. Different learning
rates are also tested; 0%, resulting in all agents retaining
the strategy they were initialised with, 50%, permitting half
of the agents (at random) to undergo learning, and 100%,
resulting in all agents engaging in learning per day. Fig-
ure 3 (Bottom Row) shows the change in strategy distri-
bution across all parameters and learning rates. Within the
maximum number of days available in these simulations nei-
ther the social nor selfish strategy is eradicated from the pop-
ulation (which is possible with the payoff-biased learning
in Algorithm 1). In fact, it is often the case that close to
a 50:50 distribution of strategies is retained, indicating no
significant change due to learning. We do find that the so-
cial strategy begins to dominate the population when 50 ex-
changes per day are allowed, the simulation has run for over
half the maximum number of days, and learning is imple-
mented. But when the learning rate is set to 50%, and the
number of exchanges exceeds 150, we see the population
distributions beginning to swing in the favour of the selfish
strategy. Increasing the learning rate to 100% does stop the
selfish strategy gaining prominence under these conditions
but does not even get close to eradicating the selfish strat-
egy.
Given the (near) optimal performance demonstrated by
social agents (without social capital) observed in Figure 2,
where the social strategy existed in isolation, it is clear from
Figure 3 (Middle Row) that the inclusion of the selfish strat-
egy has a detrimental effect of the satisfaction of social
agents, whilst improving the satisfaction of selfish agents
(Figure 3 (Top Row)). The only time the social strategy
achieves an advantage over the selfish strategy is when ex-
changes are set at 50 per day – this result appears to be more
a result of 50 exchanges not being sufficient to allow the
selfish strategy to achieve its best performance, whilst be-
ing sufficient for the social strategy to do so. The negative
consequences of the continued use of the selfish strategy to
overall satisfaction of the populations, compared to when so-
Figure 2: Average satisfaction of single strategy populations. For all plots the y-axis shows the simulated day satisfaction
was measured on, and the x-axis shows the number of exchanges an agent is permitted to engage in per day. (Left) Average
satisfaction for populations of selfish agents. (Middle) Average satisfaction for populations of social agents without social
capital. (Right) Average satisfaction for populations of social agents with social capital.
cial strategies are applied in isolation, are clearly apparent.
Whilst the social strategy is necessary for selfish agents to
improve their satisfaction, through exploitation of the social
agents’ willingness to exchange, it is to the detriment of the
overall satisfaction of the population. It is therefore in the
interests of the populations to remove the selfish strategy. In
effect, without social capital selfish agents are able to par-
asitise social agents to the detriment of the population as a
whole.
Mixed Populations with Social Capital
As in Figure 2, populations using the social strategy whilst
keeping track of social capital exhibit a slower progression
toward optimal satisfaction, as they only start accepting neu-
tral exchanges as social capital accumulates over the days.
This is also the case when the selfish strategy is included in
a combined population (Figure 4). However, unlike mixed
populations where social capital is not tracked (see Figure
3), populations tracking and using social capital are able to
achieve optimal (or near optimal) satisfaction when afforded
enough exchanges, and the simulation is ran for over 100
days. As the learning rate is increased to 50% the number
of exchanges required to achieve near optimal average satis-
faction scores amongst social agents drops, though it is inter-
esting to note that increasing the learning rate again to 100%
does cause a drop in satisfaction when fewer exchanges per
day are permitted.
Social capital thus has the effect of slowing down optimi-
sation, but with the benefit of hindering the ability of selfish
agents to gain any traction in the population. We can see that
when learning is set to 0% selfish agents, despite making up
half of the population, struggle achieve the same kinds of
satisfaction scores as previously seen when social capital is
not available (compare Figure 3 (Left) to Figure 4 (Left)).
As these selfish agents cannot accumulate social capital, de-
sired time-slots held by other agents are harder to obtain than
when social capital is not tracked. This enables social agents
to build up exchange networks using social capital that can-
not be invaded by selfish agents. When learning is intro-
duced, the inclusion of social capital effectively eradicates
the selfish strategy from the population. As social agents
are on average more satisfied than selfish ones, with this ef-
fect becoming more apparent as the simulation goes on for
more days or more exchanges are permitted, selfish agents
increasingly switch strategies. Conversely, with no opportu-
nity for selfish agents to parasitise the population there is lit-
tle gradient for social agents to switch to the selfish strategy.
We can see in Figure 4 (Bottom) that inclusion of learning
and social capital results in the entire population adopting
the social strategy. Increasing learning to 100% does slow
the removal of the selfish strategy down, as it introduces the
possibility of social agents switching to the selfish strategy
in cases where some selfish agents have achieved high sat-
isfaction by luck alone (i.e. being randomly allocated all of
their preferred time slots), but generally learning combined
with social capital has the effects of removing the selfish
strategy form the population, leading to near optimal satis-
faction scores when provided with enough exchanges and
enough simulated days.
The Population-level Effect of Social Capital
Despite the introduction of social capital removing the self-
ish strategy, and achieving near optimal satisfaction across
a number of parameter settings, it is still the case the over-
all population satisfactions (averaged over both selfish and
social agents) are similar when comparing populations with
and without social capital (Figure 5). Due to social cap-
ital slowing down the rate at which social agents undergo
exchanges, when only a low number of exchanges per day
are available, or the simulations are stopped after a few
Figure 3: Average satisfaction of selfish and social agents in mixed populations without social capital. For all plots the y-axis
shows the simulated day satisfaction was measured on, and the x-axis shows the number of exchanges an agent is permitted
to engage in per day. (Top Row) Average satisfaction of selfish agents. (Middle Row) Average satisfaction of social agents.
(Bottom Row) Proportion of population using the social strategy; green indicates a greater proportion of social agents; purple
indicates a greater proportion of selfish agents.
days, populations without social capital actually outperform
populations with social capital, despite selfish agents being
largely present in populations without social capital. Once
learning is introduced, the number of exchanges per day
are increased, and the simulation is permitted to run for ex-
tended amount of time, we do begin to see social capital pop-
ulations outperforming those without social capital, though
only by a small margin. Taking just the raw satisfaction re-
sults for the 500th day, we do see a significant difference be-
tween the satisfaction of social capital and non social capital
populations over most parameter settings. Using a Mann-
Whitney U test, we observe p-values where p < 0.01 over
most parameter settings (see Table 2), the exceptions being
when learning is 50% and exchanges are set to 1, and when
learning is 100% and exchanges are low (1 or 50). These
results indicate that by the 500th day of the simulation, so-
cial capital populations where learning is enabled (at 50% or
above) are significantly more satisfied than non social capi-
tal populations.
Mann-Whitney U: p < 0.01
Exchanges
Learning
0% 50% 100%
1 True False False
50 True True False
100 True True True
150 True True True
200 True True True
Table 2: Mann-Whitney U test p-values when comparing
satisfaction of agents in populations with and without social
capital. Test conducted for 500th day only. p < 0.01 =
True, p ≥ 0.01 = False.
Discussion
We have extended the Petruzzi et al. (2013) model to an-
swer two research questions. Our first question was, to what
extent is the tracking of social capital a necessary feature
Figure 4: Average satisfaction of selfish and social agents in mixed populations with social capital. For all plots the y-axis
shows the simulated day satisfaction was measured on, and the x-axis shows the number of exchanges an agent is permitted
to engage in per day. (Top Row) Average satisfaction of selfish agents. (Middle Row) Average satisfaction of social agents.
(Bottom Row) Proportion of population using the social strategy; green indicates a greater proportion of social agents; purple
indicates a greater proportion of selfish agents.
Figure 5: Average difference in satisfaction between all agents in populations with and without social capital. In all rows purple
indicates higher satisfaction in populations without social capital, orange indicates higher satisfaction in populations with social
capital. For all plots the y-axis shows the simulated day satisfaction was measured on, and the x-axis shows the number of
exchanges an agent is permitted to engage in per day.
of the exchange mechanism? We demonstrated that if so-
cial agents exist in isolation in a pure population, then they
end up more satisfied when social capital is not tracked, for
cases where the number of days that the simulation is run for
is low. When the number of days is increased, they perform
similar to when social capital is tracked. Thus, in pure popu-
lations with no possibility of selfish agents being introduced
then tracking of social capital is not beneficial. Moreover,
tracking social capital is detrimental under some conditions
since it requires more days before social agents start accept-
ing neutral exchanges, and hence more days before they es-
cape from sub-optimal initial allocations.
However, in a real system we must allow for the possi-
bility that agents may act selfishly, or may learn to do so
over time. To account for this, we have considered mixed
populations where both social and selfish agents are present
and can exchange with each other. In this case, social agents
are able to achieve (near to) optimal satisfaction when so-
cial capital is tracked, whereas without social capital they do
less well. This effect becomes more pronounced once agents
are permitted to adjust their strategy by payoff-biased learn-
ing. This is because without social capital, selfish agents are
able to persist in the population under payoff-biased learn-
ing. Their persistence is detrimental both to social agents
and to the population as a whole, since by not accepting
neutral exchanges they can prevent the agents escaping from
sub-optimal allocations. Conversely, with social capital self-
ish agents are effectively purged from the population under
payoff-biased learning, which has a significant positive ef-
fect on the satisfaction of the collective population.
The results with payoff-biased (social) learning also an-
swer our second research question: should we expect self-
interested agents to adopt the selfish or the social strategy?
This is because under payoff-biased learning, agents will
only change their strategy if they see another agent is doing
better than itself under another strategy. Thus, our results
suggest that self-interested agents should adopt the social
strategy if social capital is tracked, but without social capital
there is no pressure for them to do so.
Recent research has shown that a diverse range of agent-
based mechanisms can be effective at managing community
energy systems. Allowing agents to form self-organised
clusters working to optimise their collective performance
has shown to be an effective approach with larger population
sizes (Cˇausˇevic´ et al., 2017). There are also more complex
algorithms that have the potential to be highly effective at
managing decentralised heating systems(Kolen et al., 2017;
Dengiz and Jochem, 2020). Our work differs in that it is in-
herently human facing. A real world implementation of our
system could easily operate in a socio-technical manner in
which individuals can take over from the virtual agent rep-
resenting them, setting their own preferences for time-slots
and making decisions on whether or not to accept requested
exchanges. Utilising a system based on social capital repre-
sented as ‘favours’ would also be easy for the average user
to understand facilitating procedural justice.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated a decentralised
mechanism for household load balancing that is effective
at satisfying agents’ preferences. The benefits of a decen-
tralised mechanism are that it is inherently scalable as more
agents are introduced (Petruzzi et al., 2013), and helps to
promote privacy and trust by not requiring households to
submit their time-slot preferences to a centralised author-
ity. In a real implementation, the exchanges may be per-
formed by software agents running on home gateways in-
stalled in households. This could involve various levels of
user engagement with the exchange process. The mech-
anism could also be used alongside differential pricing –
households could be given a cheaper rate in their allocated
time-slots. Future work should empirically investigate how
users perceive distributive and procedural justice both with
and without tracking social capital (Powers et al., 2019).
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